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 ABSTRACT  
 
Location based encryption enhances security by 
integrating position and time into encryption and 
decryption processes. We find that from a security 
perspective, it is not enough to simply enable or disable 
decryption based on location and time; these aspects must 
be integrated into the key construction process. 
Furthermore, keys or files in transit should not reveal 
anything regarding their locations/times of applicability. 
After reviewing the objectives of location-based 
encryption, this paper introduces a specific approach 
called geo-encryption. 
 
The described geo-encryption approach builds on 
established cryptographic algorithms and protocols in a 
way that provides an additional layer of security beyond 
that provided by conventional cryptography.  It allows 
data to be encrypted for a specific location(s) or for 
specific area(s), e.g. a corporation’s campus area. 
Constraints in time as well as location can also be 
enforced. Geo-encryption can be used with both fixed and 
mobile applications and supports a wide range of data 
sharing and distribution policies. 
 
We then discuss a process of applying successive geo-
encryptions at the originating node to enforce specific 
geographic routings for transmission to the final 
destination node. With each intervening node removing 
one layer of encryption, unless the file has gone through 
the proper sequence of nodes, decryption will fail. Using 
a similar process, messages can be location authenticated 
by applying one layer of encryption at each intervening 
node.  
 
Next, we discuss some specific applications. In the 
civilian sector, there has been a great deal of interest in 
providing location-based security for digital cinema 
distribution and forensic analysis in cases of piracy.  In 
this application, the same, large (25 to 190 Gbyte), 
encrypted media file might be used at multiple theatre 
locations but with distinct GeoLocked keys specific to the 
 intended recipient location and exhibition license. This 
provides a secure and efficient point to multipoint 
distribution model applicable to distributions via satellite 
or DVD. At the exhibition hall, robust 
watermarking/steganographic techniques can introduce 
location, time and exhibition license information into the 
exhibition for subsequent use in piracy investigations. 
 
For the military GPS user, we show how individual 
waypoints can be uniquely encrypted so as to be 
accessible only when the set is physically within the route 
parameters; both location and time wise. An intact, 




On September 17, 2000, Qualcomm CEO and Chairman 
Irwin Jacob’s IBM Thinkpad computer was stolen while 
he stood a few feet from it. 
 
“…was startled to find his laptop missing from 
the podium after he wrapped up questions from 
the Society of American Business Editors and 
Writers in Irvine, Calif.” Forbes Magazine 
 
Fortunately, his hard drive was password protected. 
 
“… at one of the largest technology companies, 
where policy required that passwords exceed 8 
characters, mix cases, and include numbers or 
symbols...  
 
• L0phtCrack obtained 18% of the passwords 
in 10 minutes  
• 90% of the passwords were recovered within 
48 hours on a Pentium II/300  
• The Administrator and most Domain Admin 
passwords were cracked”  
@stake website advertising their LC4 password 
audit and recovery product 
 
Government people know better. 
 
“The Pentagon is investigating whether 
ultrasecret "black programs" were compromised 
by former CIA Director John Deutch after he put 
details about some of the Defense Department's 
most sensitive activities on his home computers.” 
Washington Times, 17 February 2000. 
 
People tend to be the weakest link in security. 
 
On the subject of computer security: “…the 
mathematics are impeccable, the computers are 
vincible, the networks are lousy, and the people 
are abysmal.” Bruce Schneier, “Secrets & Lies, 
Digital Security in a Networked World Network and computer security is rarely breeched using a 
brute force attack against cryptographic elements; the 
algorithms are simply too strong. Instead, attackers rely 
on myriad techniques that take advantage of operating 
systems features, attack protocols, use insider access, 
exploit human weaknesses, or obtain information through 
social engineering.  
 
Geo-encryption builds on established cryptographic 
algorithms and protocols in a way that provides an 
additional layer of security beyond that provided by 
conventional cryptography.  It allows data to be encrypted 
for a specific place or broad geographic area, and supports 
constraints in time as well as space.  It can be used with 
both fixed and mobile applications and supports a range 
of data sharing and distribution policies.  It provides full 
protection against attempts to bypass the location feature.  
Depending on the implementation, it can also provide 




The term “location-based encryption” is used here to refer 
to any method of encryption wherein the cipher text can 
only be decrypted at a specified location.  If an attempt is 
made to decrypt the data at another location, the 
decryption process fails and reveals no information about 
the plaintext.  The device performing the decryption 
determines its location using some sort of location sensor, 
for example, a GPS receiver or some other satellite or 
radio frequency positioning system. 
 
Location-based encryption can be used to ensure that data 
cannot be decrypted outside a particular facility, for 
example, the headquarters of a government agency or 
corporation, or an individual’s office or home.  
Alternatively, it may be used to confine access to a broad 
geographic region.  Time as well as space constraints may 
be placed on the decryption location. 
 
A Short Tutorial On Encryption Algorithms 
 
Broadly speaking; encryption algorithms can be divided 
into two categories; symmetric algorithms and 
asymmetric algorithms. Referring to figure 1, symmetric 
algorithms use the same key for encrypting and 
decrypting plaintext. Numerous, very fast symmetric 
algorithms are in widespread use including: DES & 
Triple-DES as described in [1] and the newly released 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) described in [2]. 
Keeping the key private is essential to maintaining 
security and therein lays the key question; how to share 
keys securely. Numerous techniques have been developed 
and the interested reader is directed to [3] for further 
discussion. 
Asymmetric algorithms are comparatively new on the 
scene with the first published description [4] in 1976. 
Also known as Public Key algorithms, these algorithms 
have distinct keys for encryption and decryption as is 
shown in figure 2. Here, Key_E can be used to encipher 
the plaintext but not to decipher it. A separate key 
(Key_D) is needed to perform this function.  
 
In principle, to securely convey the plaintext, the intended 
recipient could generate a key pair (Key_E, Key_D) and 
send Key_E, the public key, to the originator via 
unsecured channels. This would allow the originator (or 
anyone else) to encrypt plaintext for transmittal to the 
recipient who uses Key_D, the private key, to decrypt the 
plaintext.  
 
RSA, named after its creators Rivest, Shamir & Adleman 
is perhaps the most popular asymmetric algorithm in use 
today. Its security is based on the difficulty of factoring 
large prime numbers. 
 
One major drawback with asymmetric algorithms is that 
their computational speed is typically orders of magnitude 
(~1,000) slower than comparable symmetric algorithms. 
This has led to the notion of hybrid algorithms such as the 
one shown in figure 3.  
 
Here, a random key, sometimes called the session key, is 
generated by the originator and sent to the recipient using 
an asymmetric algorithm. This session key is then used by 



















 both parties to communicate securely using a much faster 
symmetric algorithm. The hybrid approach has found 
wide application, most notably on the Internet where it 
forms the basis for secure browsers (Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL)) and secure e-mail.  
 
The GeoEncryption Algorithm 
 
In principle, one could cryptographically bind (attach) a 
set of location and time specifications to the cyphertext 
file and build devices that would decrypt the file only 
when within the specified location & time constraints. 
There are several potential problems with such an 
approach: 
 
• The resultant file reveals the physical location of 
the intended recipient. The military frowns on 
this sort of thing, at least for their own forces. 
Furthermore, it provides vital information to 
someone who wants to spoof the device. 
 
• If the device is vulnerable to tampering, it may 
be possible to modify it so as to completely 
bypass the location check.  The modified device 
would decrypt all received data without 
acquiring its location and verifying that it is 
correct.  Alternatively, an adversary might 
compromise the keys and build a modified 
decryption device without the location check.  
Either way, the modified device could be used 
anywhere and location would be irrelevant 
 
As another possibility, one might consider using location 
itself as the cryptographic key to an otherwise strong 
encryption algorithm like AES.  This is ill advised in that 
location is unlikely to have sufficient entropy 
(uncertainty) to provide strong protection.  Even if an 
adversary does not know the precise location, there may 
be enough information to enable a rapid brute force attack 
analogous to a dictionary attack. For example, suppose 
that location is coded as a latitude-longitude pair at the 
precision of 1 centimeter, and that an adversary is able to 

















narrow down the latitude and longitude to within a 
kilometer.  Then there are only 100,000 possible values 
for each of latitude and longitude, or 10 billion possible 
pairs (keys).  Testing each of these would be easy.    
 
Applying an obfuscation function to the location value 
before using it as a key could strengthen this approach; 
however, the function would have to be kept secret in 
order to prevent the adversary from doing the same.  In 
general, security by obscurity is scoffed at, because once 
the secret method is exposed, it becomes useless.  The 
entire security system collapses like a house of cards.   
 
A guiding principle behind the development of 
cryptographic systems has been that security should not 
depend on keeping the algorithms secret, only the keys.  
This does not mean that the algorithms must be made 
public, only that they be designed to withstand attack 
under the assumption that the adversary knows them.  
Security is then achieved by encoding the secrets in the 
keys, designing the algorithm so that the best attack 
requires an exhaustive search of the key space, and using 
sufficiently long keys that exhaustive search is infeasible. 
 
GeoCodex’s GeoEncryption algorithm addresses these 
issues by building on established security algorithms and 
protocols. Referring to figure 4, our approach modifies 
the previously discussed Hybrid algorithm to include a 
GeoLock. 
 
On the originating (encrypting) side, a GeoLock is 
computed based on the intended recipient’s Position, 
Velocity, and Time (PVT) block. The PVT block defines 
where the recipient needs to be in terms of position, 
velocity & time for decryption to be successful. The 
GeoLock is then XORed with the session key (Key_S) to 
form a GeoLocked session key. The resultant is then 
encrypted using an asymmetric algorithm and conveyed 
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GeoLockto the recipient, much like we saw in the Hybrid 
algorithm of figure 3. On the recipient (decryption) side, 
GeoLocks are computed using an AntiSpoof GPS receiver 
for PVT input into the PVT→GeoLock mapping function. 
If the PVT values are correct, then the resultant GeoLock 
will XOR with the GeoLocked key to provide the correct 
session key (Key_S). 
 
PVT→GeoLock mapping function 
 
Sidestepping the issue of what constitutes an AntiSpoof 
receiver for the moment, we now address how GeoLocks 
are formed. Figure 5 shows a notional diagram of a 
PVT→GeoLock mapping function where latitude, 
longitude and time constitute the inputs. Here, a regular 
grid of latitude, longitude and time values has been 
created, each with an associated GeoLock value. 
 
Grid spacing must take into account the accuracy of the 
GPS receiver at the decrypting site; otherwise erroneous 
GeoLock values may result. It makes no sense to have 
1cm grid spacing if using a standalone GPS receiver. 
Conversely, if using an RTK style receiver capable of 
2cm accuracy, 10-meter grid spacing is overly 
conservative. Grid spacing may also be wider in the 
vertical direction to account for poorer vertical 
positioning accuracy typical in most sets because of 
satellite geometries [5]. 
 
Figure 6 shows the number of possible grid points on the 
planet as a function of grid spacing, ignoring altitude, 
time and velocity.  
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A more complete PVT→GeoLock mapping function 
could actually have eight inputs: 
 
• Position (East, North, Up) 
• Velocity (East, North, Up) 
• Time 
• Coordinate System Parameters 
 
The velocity inputs might actually map into a minimum 
speed requirement so as to ensure that the recipient is 
actually underway. Including coordinate system 
parameters in the PVT→GeoLock mapping function 
provides support for non-stationary reference frames. This 
feature might be used, for example, in communicating 
with a satellite. 
 
The grid could just as well been based on a Military Grid 
Reference System (MGRS) or it’s close cousin UTM. In 
fact, any arbitrary shapes could have been used; for 
example the shape of the Disneyland theme park could 
map to a single GeoLock value so as to permit successful 
decryption when located in the theme park but not when 
outside. 
 
Finally, we note that the PVT→GeoLock mapping 
function itself may incorporate a hash function or one-
way function with cryptographic aspects in order to 
hinder using the GeoLock to obtain PVT block values. 
Similarly, the algorithm may be deliberately slow and 
difficult; perhaps based on solving a difficult problem. 
 
A Few Quick Observations On AntiSpoof Receivers 
 
Most civilian receivers are trivially simple to spoof; 
simply hook up one of the many excellent signal 
simulators available and the receiver will buy into 
whatever PVT values you want [6]. This is why military 
receivers use Y-code; an encrypted version of P-code. 
Unless the spoofer has access to the correct cryptographic 
keys and knows how to generate Y-code from P-code, it 
can’t spoof the military set. He may be able to jam it, but 
not spoof it.  










































Civilian sets can be made difficult to spoof through a 
series of hardening measures. These include a variety of 
signal’s checks: 
 
• Use J/N meter to check for above normal energy 
levels 
• Monitor C/No meter for Consistency/ 
Unexpected C/No given J/N 
• Monitor Phase Difference Between Antenna 
Elements (All signals shouldn’t come from the 
same direction) 
• Deep Acquisition to Look for Weak, Real 
Signals 
 
Numerous navigation checks can also be instituted: 
 
• Compare “Watch Time” with “Signals Time” 
(Most signal generators can’t synchronize with 
GPS time) 
• Continuity Checks in Time and Position (There 
is no hyperspace button in real life) 
• Consistency with other Navigation Sensors 
• Large Residuals, Particularly in Differential 
Correction Channel(s) 
• RAIM Type Functions 
 
With careful attention to detail, civilian sets do not have 
to be as vulnerable to spoofing as most of them are. 
 
Relay Encryption to Force a Particular Routing & For 
Authentication 
 
Successive Geo-encryption can be used to force data 
and/or keys to follow a specific geographical path before 
it can be decrypted. This is achieved by applying multiple 
geo-locks at the origination node prior to transmittal using 
a procedure such as the one shown in figure 7. As each 
required node is traversed, one layer of GeoLocking is 
removed, thus ensuring the desired path has been 
followed. 
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Relay encryption might be useful for applications that 
employ regional distribution centers for the distribution of 
data supplied by producers.  For example, in subscription 
television, the producers could be the television networks, 
while the distributors are cable or satellite television 
providers.  A producer could lock a key initially to a 
geographic region covered by one of the distributors using 
a key known only to the subscribers, and then to the 
precise location of the distributor using the distributor’s 
key.  The distributor would unlock its geo-lock before 
broadcasting the programming to subscribers, who would 
then unlock the regional geo-lock and decrypt the 
cyphertext. 
 
In some applications, it may be desirable to know that a 
message has followed a particular route. Figure 8 depicts 
a process similar to the Route Forcing technique for 
achieving this, where each traversed node in effect stamps 




To show how GeoEncryption can be applied to real world 
problems, we discuss two examples: digital cinema 
distribution, and, GPS receiver waypoint GeoEncryption. 
 
Digital Cinema Distribution 
 
“Today, the film studios spend over $1 billion each year 
to duplicate, distribute, rejuvenate, redistribute and 
ultimately destroy the thousands of film reels required to 
bring the close to 500 films released each year to 
audiences across the U.S.” Booz Allen Hamilton: 
DIGITAL CINEMA: BREAKING THE LOGJAM 
 
SATCOM links provide for a very efficient and cost 
effective digital cinema distribution model but piracy is a 
major concern; SATCOM links are easy to intercept. The 
experience with Direct Satellite Services (DSS) has not 
been encouraging. There are an estimated 3 million 
unauthorized users using cloned versions of the tamper 
resistant smart cards that seek to prevent this. 
Furthermore, cinema stakeholders are risk adverse 
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Expected Location 1Expected Location 2
Secure Position Secure Position Secure Positiontowards piracy based on the music industry’s experience 
with Napsterization. Music sales are down 8% and 
company valuations are down 40%, largely because of 
piracy.  
 
As a consequence, there has been significant interest in 
providing location-based security for digital cinema 
distribution and forensic analysis in cases of piracy.  
GeoCodex has been working with Digital Cinema 
Ventures (DCV) to develop security techniques specific 
to this industry. 
 
In this application, the same, large (25 to 190 Gbyte), 
encrypted media file might be used at multiple theatre 
locations nationwide but with distinct GeoLocked keys 
specific to the intended recipient location and its 
exhibition license. This provides a secure and efficient 
point to multipoint distribution model applicable to 
distributions via satellite or DVD. At the exhibition hall, 
robust watermarking/steganographic techniques can 
introduce location, time and exhibition license 
information into the exhibition for subsequent use in 
piracy investigations. 
 
Figure 9 depicts a media distribution reference model 
wherein a Studio Control policy is maintained. In this 
model, we start with the Telecine, which produces the 
Digital Cinema Master, an uncompressed, highest 
resolution digital version taken from the film masters. The 
postproduction house assembles and converts the DC 
master into multiple versions, possibly for presentation 
and exhibition on a variety of media (e.g. Theatre, DVD, 
Cable TV). A postproduction server then provides 
multiple encryptions of the multiple versions for 
distribution. Individual distributors are expected (but not 
required) to have their own servers to source their own 
facilities. Theatres receive copies of the media file in non-
real-time; storing a copy on their local server. The Theatre 
server then provides the still encrypted media file to an 
authorized, tamper resistant projector, which contains 
Figure 9: Media Distribution Reference Model 
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sufficient buffering to source the real-time decryption and 
exhibition of the media file. 
 
Placing four successive locks on the random key (ala. 
Figure 7), the studio proxy can force the key to traverse 
the distribution carrier’s server which takes off its lock 
(U4A), the Theatre server which takes off its lock (U3A) 
and finally, the projector which takes off its lock (U2A) 
and the studio’s lock (U0A).  Only the projector and the 
studio proxy can access the random key needed to decrypt 
the media file. Intervening stages of distribution are 
critically involved in key transmittal and partial 
decryption, but they have no access to the plaintext 
media. 
 
Waypoint GeoLocking for Improved Mission Security 
 
To navigate with GPS, users typically follow a route 
consisting of an ordered series of waypoints. In its 
simplest form, a waypoint is nothing more than a position 
but in airborne applications it may contain velocity 
expectations and time of transit expectations as well. In 
military applications, velocity & time of transit 
specifications are used in launching coordinated attacks 
where diverse force elements converge on target(s) 
simultaneously. Ground forces routinely use GPS to 
place, and then traverse mine fields via safe routes. 
 
Extended waypoint/regional information can include: 
 
• Radio Contact Parameters 
o Frequency 
o IFF Parameters 
• Weapons Parameters/Restrictions 
• Crypto variables 
 
In short, for the military user, the waypoints and 
associated routes comprise some of the most sensitive 
data in the military GPS set and should be protected 
accordingly. GeoEncryption can provide an additional 
layer of security by restricting access to waypoint data 
based on location, time & velocity. 
 
Figure 10 depicts a notional mission profile consisting of 
a series of waypoints where we have defined regions of 
access for waypoints 2 & 3. There is no particular 
requirement that the PVT→GeoLock mapping function 
be based on a regular grid and here; we have chosen 
polygonal shapes based on mission needs. Also, note that 
GeoLock regions can overlap; they do not have to be 
geographically disjoint from one another. Time & 
velocity window requirements could also have been 
imposed. 
As an added refinement, we could also define a “keep 
waypoints” region (shown in yellow). If the set exits this 
area, perhaps due to capture, it can destroy its waypoints. 
Alternatively, it might display a different set of waypoints and routes, maybe with misleading descriptions. For 
example, it might display a route titled “Safe Route 
Through Minefield” that in fact really leads over the 
mines. The set could also be configured to display 
erroneous position when outside of its authorized area. 
Integrated into weapons systems, they may refuse to fire 
(or worse) when outside of their authorized areas. The 





Geo-encryption is an approach to location-based 
encryption that builds on established cryptographic 
algorithms and protocols.  It allows data to be encrypted 
for a specific place or broad geographic area, and supports 
constraints in time as well as space.  It can support both 
fixed and mobile applications, and a variety of data 
sharing and distribution policies.  It provides full 
protection against location bypass.  Depending on the 
implementation, it also can provide strong protection 
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Figure 10: Waypoint GeoEncryption to Secure 
Mission Information 
 
